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U.S. POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA AND CENTRAL AMERICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA AND CENTRAL AMERICA

TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Helms, Pell, Glenn, Zorinsky, and Tsongas.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Enders, we always find it a pleasure to welcome you before this committee. I do not know if that feeling is shared by you or not.

Mr. ENDERS. It is, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked you here today to explore with us the broad framework of our policy in Central America. It is clear that there is increasing interest and concern in the Congress over the recent reports of large-scale counter-revolutionary activities in Nicaragua and the allegations that the United States may be supporting this effort in some way.

I know that you cannot speak to those issues in open session. However, this committee's interest in the subject lies in the broader context of the implications of such policies for our overall goals in Central America. In light of recent reporting of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua and recent committee discussions of efforts to bring about dialogue in El Salvador, I believe there continues to be uncertainty as to the direction and purpose of a number of the programs that have been proposed for the Central American region.

I am hopeful that you can explain to the committee what U.S. goals for the Central American region are and that you can persuade us that the various threads of policy toward the region combine to reflect a consistent approach that has a high probability of success.

As always, we want to work with you and reason with you. This is the time to sit down and reason, and I think it is a wise thing, this committee's decision and your decision to have this part of it in the open, because this is a subject of tremendous concern to Americans who are deeply interested in Central American and Latin American affairs, and certainly to the region itself, and this open forum is that opportunity, and we welcome your statement, and we will follow up with questions.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell first, if I could recognize him, unless you want to yield.

Senator GLENN. Go ahead.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think we find ourselves in really quite a contradictory position here, because we are very critical, and properly so, of the assistance that the guerrillas in El Salvador have received from outside supporters—weapons, training, men—whether it be from Cuba or elsewhere. At the same time we find ourselves doing exactly the same thing in Nicaragua for which we are criticizing the Sandinistas for doing in El Salvador. From what I read in the press, we are engaging in activities of moving guns, weapons, and training for antigovernment Nicaraguans.

I think we should make up our mind about what our policy is. Do we oppose the use of external military means to overturn a government, or do we support it? I do not think we can pick and choose, like cherries, between one country and another, particularly when they are next door, because it puts us in a very contradictory position.

The other point I hope we can touch on at some point is the question of law; and as you know, Mr. Secretary, the law reads that when the Intelligence Committees find that they are dealing with a subject that requires the attention of other committees in the Congress, that it should be brought to the attention of those committees, and I for one am wondering whether or not these activities, which are done subject to oversight authority of the Intelligence Committee, should be formally referred to us as well for our attention.

I would be interested in the reaction of the witness to that.

Finally, I would like to ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a letter to the President from the Bishops of Rhode Island, Washington, and Michigan, who recently were in Nicaragua, and made a very telling report, and wrote a letter to the President suggesting that we are not following the most sensible course in that part of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the letter will be incorporated into the record at this point.

[The letter referred to follows:]

DIOCESE OF WASHINGTON,
MOUNT SAINT ALBAN,
Washington, D.C., March 29, 1983.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We, the undersigned, write you at this time because the subject of Nicaragua has become a matter of public concern and debate. We write as individuals, bound by the imperatives of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and as citizens and voters, who also hold positions of responsibility in the Episcopal Church in the United States. We do not write as representing the Episcopal Church nor any other organization of which we may be members. We are George N. Hunt, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Rhode Island, H. Coleman McGehee, Jr., Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan, and John T. Walker, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Washington.

We have just returned from an intense visit in Nicaragua. During our time there we were able to visit with people representing every political point of view. We also visited many places in Managua and its environs including Masaya and Granada.

We were asked to come to Nicaragua by the Rt. Rev. Cornelius J. Wilson, Episcopal Bishop of Costa Rica who also serves as Interim Bishop of the Episcopal Church in Nicaragua. In the company of Bishop Wilson we conversed at length with the Papal Nuncio, the Archbishop of Managua, leaders of the Episcopal Church of Nicaragua, representatives of two important ecumenical groups, a number of persons of the Eastern or Mesquito Coast of Nicaragua (one of them being a priest of the Episcopal Church and another a pastor of the Moravian Church. The latter Church is a product of missionary activity supported by the Moravian Church of Pennsylvania). In addition we were able to interview at length one member of the ruling Junta of the Sandinist Party, Senor Sergio Ramirez, and Senor Carlos Tunnermann, the Government's Minister of Education.

What we saw and heard led us to conclude that the vast majority of people in Nicaragua want a dialogue to begin immediately among the differing groups within the country regarding the political direction of the nation. Of equal clarity is their desire that a similar dialogue begin between the United States and the Government of Nicaragua. Everywhere we were asked to convey this message to our President and to the American people. Hence, the open form of this letter.

We recognize how complicated the problems are in Central America and particularly with the differing factions in Nicaragua. Nevertheless, our experience in Nicaragua leads us to ask three things of you.

First, that serious consideration be given to the opening of dialogue with the Nicaraguan Government. This is urgent because we came away believing that there is yet time to influence the leaders of the revolution in Nicaragua.

Second, that a bold and imaginative initiative, a kind of "Marshall Plan" for Central America, be made to assist those who are victims of strife along the frontier or who have been displaced by the revolution or by counter-revolutionary activities; and those made homeless by recent floods. Medical supplies and food are needed immediately.

Finally, we trust that if we are in any way aiding the contra-revolutionary forces (the Samosistas) that such aid will cease and that our efforts will be used to help provide stability internally and along the border. The most commonly held view in Nicaragua is that we are supplying arms to the Samosistas as well as to the people of the East Coast.

Far be it from us to presume that we are more knowledgeable than those who are responsible for our nation's foreign policy. Nor are we naive about the importance of the threat of marxism or the influence of other Communist governments in Nicaragua. We do believe that through dialogue we may have a positive effect on Nicaragua and on the other nations of Central America. Absent any dialogue we may find that our worst fears may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN T. WALKER,
Bishop of Washington.
GEORGE N. HUNT,
Bishop of Rhode Island.
H. COLEMAN MCGEHEE, Jr.,
Bishop of Michigan.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I returned last evening thinking that we were going to be in executive session, and that we were really going to get to the heart of this. We are dealing with some very sensitive intelligence information.

We are talking about not only whether we are attempting to intercept arms on their way through Nicaragua to El Salvador, but also whether we now have gone into a situation where our primary objective is to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. If press reports of this are correct, it seems to me that that is what the objective of his hearing should be.

I do not see how we are going to get into that kind of information, which is extremely sensitive intelligence information, particularly as it relates to other nations, whether Argentina was involved, as has been alleged in the press, and whether we have now replaced Argentina in our efforts to overthrow the government.

It seems to me that this is of the most highly sensitive nature, and I would be glad to hear the Chair's comments as to why this was moved into open session. I would be prepared to move that we go into executive session, perhaps with principals only, so we really can get into the heart of this thing. It seems to me we are trying to get the fundamentals here as to whether our law has been violated, as to whether we are just attempting to intercept the arms going into

El Salvador or whether we are trying to overthrow the Nicaragua Government by other means.

I do not see how we can even begin to address problems of that nature in open session, and I would like to hear the Chair's comment on this. I would be prepared to move that we go into executive session with principals only if that is desired.

The CHAIRMAN. I would suggest this, Senator Glenn, that in view of the fact that a notice was sent out last Thursday to committee members that this would be in open session, that it was discussed by both minority and majority staff, and an announcement was put out to that effect, Secretary Enders has prepared a statement that is unclassified, I would suggest that we proceed with the open session now, and at the completion of that, that we go into executive session.

But I would think that there is enough that can be said and should be said and has already been said in the public media and discussed, that we can hopefully shed some light for the American people to the extent that we can, and then go into executive session for that aspect of it that would be closed. We can either clear this room and go into executive session here or move over to S–116.

Senator GLENN. Do I understand correctly, then, that at the end of this open session, we will definitely have an executive session? Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if there is that request that we go into executive session, and you have made that request, and if it is concurred in by Senator Pell, and you have a motion that you would make to that effect, I would certainly concur in it.

Senator PELL. There is one other thought here, Mr. Chairman. The real responsibility for briefing us on the very classified matters we are discussing falls, I think, on our Intelligence Committee, which has the willingness and obligation to brief us on this, and I think we should take advantage of that at some time.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to advise all Senators if they do not know that the Intelligence Committee has offered to brief all Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee on any activities that require classification.

Senator GLENN. We always have that avenue open to us, but we have a representative of the State Department here. I do not think it is necessary to go third hand through the Intelligence Committee or anybody else. We have a representative of the State Department here to testify directly to the Foreign Relations Committee on what the situation is in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. So I would think that it would be advisable to go ahead and have our executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us finish up the open session here. Let us finish the very brief business session in open session. This is our regular business session for the committee on Tuesday. And then I would ask the majority and minority staff directors to determine whether it would be best to have that meeting in the back room here or in S–116.

Are there any other statements that anyone would like to make?

Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to attend the session afterward, because we are in a Catch-22 here. There cannot be more than maybe a half a dozen people in the world who do not know

what we are doing in Nicaragua. Most of them are on the Foreign Relations Committee. Now, the situation I am in is that I know what they are doing, because I read enough of the press reports. We have seen enough of the information on television. If I walk behind that door, and I am told what I read in the newspaper, I no longer can comment on it. I would be violating classification. We went through this the other day with the General Rowny testimony.

It seems to me the United States is engaged in activity in Nicaragua that is obvious, that we are now turning back the clock of interventionism, and I think this committee has the responsibility, A, in terms of the Boland amendment, and B, in terms of the various treaties we have signed, and C, in terms of our responsibility in foreign policy, to somehow bring this issue to a head.

And to the extent we get briefed, we are muzzled, and I want to speak out on this issue, because I think we are in Nicaragua, I think we are engaged in interventionism, and I want to speak out against it, and to the extent I have to go into a classified hearing, I am no longer free to comment.

So, for that reason, with all due respect, I will forego that opportunity, and I just want the chairman to know that I appreciate the chairman's having this open session. I think it is very important. I think a lot will be gained, because we are going to be told nothing, and the telling of nothing tells everything, in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank my distinguished colleague for sustaining the decision of the Chair in this regard, because I do feel it is important, and both sides feel it is important that we do have an open session, but it would be wise for those Senators who do wish a classified briefing to have it after the open session, so that there cannot be a contravention of that confidential classification.

We are ready for your statement, Secretary Enders. We are delighted to have you with us again.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS O. ENDERS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your welcome, and I do welcome the opportunity to review in some detail U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.

I apologize for the length of the statement I would like to make. I will omit some parts of it, but perhaps it is wise at this point, given the opportunity you offer to reason, to debate what that policy is, to state it in its full detail.

Mr. Chairman, since the Somoza government collapsed and the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua, which was in 1979, our policy has focused on attempting to convince Nicaragua to do three things, to renounce support for insurgency in neighboring countries, to abandon its pursuit of dominant military power in Central America, and to come to terms with its own society through the creation of democratic institutions.

In July 1979, the soon to be governing junta of Nicaragua pledged formally to the Organization of American State [OAS] that its goals were democratic and peaceful. The United States and indeed the entire international community accepted this pledge and embarked

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on programs of peaceful reconstruction that typically included substantial appropriations of assistance outside annual budget processes.

As the months went by, however, it became increasingly apparent that the Sandinistas saw themselves as the armed vanguard of an isthmus-wide movement. Nicaragua's new regular army, the Ejercito Popular Sandinista [EPS], was founded in 1979. By the end of last year, according to its commander, it had grown to be four times as big and eight times as strong as Somoza's Guardia Nacional. The EPS reached an estimated strength of 20,000, backed up by militias and reserves 80,000 strong.

During the period since the revolution, Nicaragua has received an estimated 125 million dollars' worth of military equipment and supplies from the Soviet Union alone. It obtained by far the heaviest tanks in Central America, heavy artillery, antiaircraft weapons, assault helicopters, rocket launchers, and patrol boats.

While military pilots and crews trained in Bulgaria and other Eastern European locations, airfields were prepared for advanced jet fighters. More significant, large numbers of foreign military and security advisers were introduced. Currently, no less than 2,000 Cubans, 50 Soviets, 35 East Germans, and 50 PLO and Libyan personnel are estimated to be stationed in Nicaragua on security missions. That is roughly one foreign military adviser for every 1,000 Nicaraguans.

In 1980, just as in 1978, Castro had brought the three main Sandinista factions together in Havana. Cuban agents brought five guerrilla factions from El Salvador together in Managua, worked out a unity pact among them, then set up a joint command and control apparatus in the Managua area, and organized logistics and training support on Nicaraguan soil.

Since that time, the great bulk of the arms and munitions used by the insurgents in El Salvador have flowed through Nicaragua. Meanwhile, the Sandinistas moved to assert a monopoly of power inside Nicaragua. Elections were ridiculed and postponed. One by one, the elements of the broad anti-Somoza coalition were shorn off.

The famous newspaper, La Prensa, was censored, independent radio and TV stations curbed, labor unions intimidated, the private sector neutralized, the Catholic Church subjected to repeated provocation and attempts at division, the Miskitos and other Nicaraguan Indian minorities persecuted.

Nicaragua's southern border in 300 miles from the Panama Canal, separated only by Costa Rica, a democracy that for almost 35 years has had no army. Its northern border is 300 miles from Mexico. In between are two states, El Salvador and Guatemala, already torn by guerrilla violence, and Honduras, whose fledgling democracy is under daily pressure from Nicaragua.

It does not take very much imagination to understand how the Sandinistas' revolution without frontiers might spread, nor how its spread might affect our security. Half our trade flows through the Caribbean, and we depend on the stability of our neighbors to avoid what in certain circumstances could become an unprecedented flow of refugees northward to this country.

Especially now, when a troubled world economy invites unrest, we must safeguard democracy and stability in our immediate neighborhood.

We have all seen predatory dictatorships of the right and the left, Germany under Hitler and the Soviet Union under Stalin and since. And there is a school that attributes the expansionism of left wing dictatorships to pressures from abroad. According to this proposition, Soviet aggressiveness is but a reaction to the creation of a network of alliances around it. Castro was made a Communist by U.S. confrontation, and Vietnam was radicalized by foreign armies.

Whatever the merits or defects of these arguments, I would like to point out that the Nicaraguan case provides ample data to test the policy that usually flows from that proposition—that left wing radicalization and aggressiveness can be prevented by the political support and economic assistance of the democracies.

Nicaragua is a country of some 2½ million people. Since 1979, it has received from the democracies and multilateral agencies $1.6 billion in economic assistance, or $640 for every man, woman, and child. The United States supplied $125 million of that. Politically, such democratic states as Mexico and the parties belonging to the Socialist International have provided consistent support.

Yet this same period marks the big buildup of the Sandinista army, the EPS, direct support for violence in El Salvador, and the consolidation of internal repression. It is clear that constructive engagement has not worked in Nicaragua.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Enders, I have just been advised that there is a possibility that you may have to leave at 11 o'clock to address the Intelligence Committee. Is that correct?

Mr. ENDERS. The Intelligence Committee is meeting, but I will leave when this hearing is over and then go and join that one.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be able to stay then straight through here?

Mr. ENDERS. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Thank you very much. You can, of course, summarize your statement in any way that you want, but I would not want to cut off any part of it that you feel is important to be in public session today. Go right ahead, then. I thought maybe we would have to brief it if you had a time problem. If you have not, that is fine.

Mr. ENDERS. Thank you.

If constructive engagement has not worked so far, negotiation has not worked any better. There have been several efforts. They continue today. I was involved in an effort, traveling to Managua in August 1981 to listen to Sandinista concerns.

They told me that they remembered the U.S. Marine occupation in the first decades of this century, that they feared a U.S. invasion, and thus needed a big army, and that we should understand that the Salvadoran guerrillas were important as a shield to protect the Nicaraguan revolution.

So, we said, OK, let us address your concerns. Let us enter into a bilateral nonaggression agreement. The United States could use its influence to encourage Nicaraguan exiles in this country to moderate their behavior, and the United States could renew its economic assistance.

In return, we asked the Sandinistas to stop training and supplying Salvadoran guerrillas, to give pluralism a chance in their own country, and to limit their military buildup perhaps through agreement with other Central American countries.

We made these proposals in writing. In October 1981, Managua formally rejected them as sterile.

A second attempt at negotiation occurred in the spring of 1982, this time at the suggestion of Mexican President Lopez Portillo. Once again, we presented concrete proposals in writing, this time elaborated in eight points presented through our Ambassador in Managua. Once again, there was no concrete response. Nicaragua simply replied that, before it could respond there would have to be a meeting at a higher level and in Mexico.

This time, it seemed to us, the Sandinistas wanted to appear to negotiate without actually doing so.

We tried a third time. Under Costa Rican leadership, a group of democratic states got together in San Jose in October 1982 to work out a comprehensive set of peace proposals for Central America as a whole. I would like to review them, because they continue to represent the essence of what we, like Nicaragua's democratic neighbors, are trying to achieve.

First, this group of democratic countries agreed that the area should be freed from East-West competition. The way to do that, we concluded, is to get all foreign military advisers and trainers from Cuba, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, the PLO, and, of course, ours, out of Central America.

Second, the Central American countries would have to find a way to live with each other without fear. To that end, the democracies proposed mutual and verifiable accords banning the import of heavy offensive weapons, renouncing their support for insurgency on neighbors' territory, and providing for international surveillance of frontiers.

And third, each Central American country would have to find a way to establish democratic institutions open to opposition elements.

Costa Rica on behalf of this group attempted to contact Nicaragua to ask whether it would enter into a dialog on the basis of these principles. The Sandinistas refused to receive the proposal, arguing they had not participated in its formulation and so were not bound to address it.

So a fourth attempt at negotiations is now being made. In January of this year, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama met on the Island of Contadora to propose an effort at mediation of Central America's conflict. Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador responded by proposing that the five Central American countries, including Nicaragua, meet in the presence of this Contadora group.

That would enable Nicaragua to take part in developing the proposals as it had not been able to do earlier. To maximize the chances that Nicaragua would participate, they suggested that the United States not be present. That would also take care of charges that the conference would be United States dominated.

But Nicaragua was still not receptive. Instead, it went to the U.N. Security Council claiming that it wants to meet bilaterally with the United States and with Honduras, not regionally. In effect, Nicaragua is saying it wants to discuss Nicaragua's charges against Honduras and the United States—but not its neighbors' concerns about Nicaragua's militarization, its dictatorship, and its intervention in El Salvador.

I have described this history at some length to give you some idea of the extraordinary difficulty of dealing with the Sandinista leadership. But despite this record we are not going to give up. The Sandinistas are obviously not yet persuaded that they have to negotiate on substance with either their neighbors or their internal critics.

Perhaps they still think that if they bob and weave enough something will change. Maybe the United States will bend or weaken its support for democratic governments in Costa Rica and El Salvador and Honduras and that the way will again be open for the revolution without frontiers. We must convince them that that is not the case and that the United States will not abandon its friends in Central America.

Meanwhile, the Nicaraguans have taken matters into their own hands. Sandinista intransigence has sparked an insurgency that the Sandinistas themselves claim is a threat. Several thousand guerrillas are now active in Nicaragua. Disillusioned Miskito Indians operate in much of their homeland in the Atlantic lowlands, in eastern and northern border departments of Jinotego and Nueva Segovia Madriz, Esteli, and Zelaya.

Significant insurgent forces are attacking government outposts and ambushing military convoys. Guerrilla activity is reported in the central coffee-growing province of Matagalpa. This month, for the first time, armed dissidence has been reported in the south. Wherever the opposition groups show up, they seem to attract local support and their numbers grow.

Who are these people who are challenging Managua's ideologues? What do they want? Well, based on what we know, there are two major groups. One of them, the larger, is the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense [FDN]. Although its main strength is inside Nicaragua, Sandinista repression has driven most of its leaders to Honduras and Costa Rica.

Its leadership is made up of a group of people who have been in many cases lifelong opponents of the Somoza regime. Some of them have been jailed for their support for opposition to Somoza. They have publicly stated that their objective is to bring democracy to Nicaragua and not a return to Somocismo.

In sociological terms, these leaders represent members of the professions and teachers, plus small businessmen and farmers. Their followers include disaffected peasants, former small farmers, Miskito Indians, and other groups displaced or simply repressed by Managua's ideologues.

We estimate that the FDN's ranks include over 1,000 guerrillas. Former National Guardsmen, mostly noncommissioned officers, lead many of these guerrilla units. Most of the members are peasants and former small farmers.

The FDN's pronouncements repudiate the Somoza past and affirm the nationalistic and patriotic principles of Sandino. As I am sure the committee is aware, the FDN proposed a peace plan on January 30, 1983, in which it offered to cease hostilities if, among other points, the Government of Nicaragua held internationally supervised elections by September 1983, revoked the stage of siege in Nicaragua, and separated public administration from partisan political and ideological activities.

The second major group, led by anti-Somoza hero, Eden Pastora, is ARDE [Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica]. ARDE's leaders include such well-known figures as former post-Somoza junta leader Alfonso Robelo, Miskito Indian leader Brooklyn Rivera, and former anti-Somoza fighter Fernando Chamorro.

Pastora, who was the original Sandinista Vice Minister of Defense, has repeatedly denounced the revolution's betrayal, which he argued was motivated by Cuban agents and forcing a sellout to the Soviet Union. Most of ARDE's statements have been issued from Costa Rica, but ARDE's February 2 peace proposal also calls for elections of a constituent assembly by June 1983 to fulfill the promise of the Sandinista revolution.

Mr. Chairman, it is not clear what the course of the struggle within Nicaragua is going to be. What is certain is that as long as Nicaragua forces legitimate dissent at home to follow violent means and persist is threatening and destabilizing its neighbors, it will never be stable, nor will Central America.

It is conceivable that Cuba or the Soviet Union could be tempted to escalate the conflict, introducing modern fighter aircraft or even Cuban combat troops. Clearly, a dangerous situation would then develop, unacceptable not only to Central America but to the American nations as a whole. We have communicated to Moscow and Havana how dangerous such a move would be.

It is also conceivable that in an effort to distract attention from their internal problems, the Sandinistas might lash out at their neighbors, attacking Costa Rica or Honduras. For over 1 year, Managua has already been running terrorist operations in San Jose and infiltrating guerrillas into northern Costa Rican provinces. There have been frequent border incidents with Honduras.

Although journalists who have visited the area report no activity on the Honduran side, Nicaragua has recently reinforced military units on the border. Again, I believe that the Sandinistas understand that they could not gain by attacking their neighbors. It is also important to stress that every resource of inter-American diplomacy, including, of course, that of this country, would be available to prevent such an outburst.

Clearly there is a better way. It is through dialog and negotiation. We asked the Sandinistas to think of the Nicaragua people. Despite all that foreign aid I mentioned, Nicaraguans in the cities and countryside are much less well off now than before the revolution. They resent the pressures on their churches and their clergy. They distrust and dislike the Sandinista monopoly of power. They lived under such a system before.

We asked the Sandinistas to consider the insurgency in their own country. Despite, or maybe it is because, of the presence of all of those armed Cubans popular resistance is spreading. They may conclude that the dialog they have so many times spurned is many times preferable to widening civil strife.

We asked the Sandinistas to consider the insurgency they are supporting in El Salvador. If it has legitimate grievances, let them be pursued through democratic institutions. The international community is willing and able to provide security and other guarantees for elections as the answer there as well as in Nicaragua.

Quite clearly, each element of the Central American problem is related to the other. No amount of land reform, or open elections, or improvement in human rights will end the conflict in El Salvador if Nicaragua continues to be able to fuel it. Democracy will not prosper in Nicaragua's neighbors unless it is practiced in Nicaragua as well. Nicaragua will not be free of the hostility of its own people and of its neighbors until it begins to address their concerns for democracy and security.

So the answer is democratization and dialog among neighbors. The purpose of the U.S. policy in the area is to create conditions in which Central America can be removed from the East-West conflict, in which the import of offensive weapons and mutual support for insurgencies can be ended and the democratic transformation of each society achieved.

That is, negotiations among all the Central American countries and negotiations within countries can provide the opportunity for all groups to compete in the voting booth rather than on the battlefield.

Thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

[Mr. Enders' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS O. ENDERS

Since the Somoza government collapsed and the Sandinistas came to power, the United States policy toward Nicaragua has focussed on attempting to convince Nicaragua to: Renounce support for insurgency in neighboring countries; abandon its pursuit of dominant military power in Central America; and come to terms with its own society through the creation of democratic institutions.

In July 1979, the soon-to-be governing Junta of Nicaragua pledged formally to the Organization of American States that its goals were democratic and peaceful. The United States, indeed the entire international community, accepted this pledge and embarked on programs of peaceful reconstruction that typically included substantial appropriations of assistance outside annual budget processes.

As the months passed, however, it became increasingly apparent that the Sandinistas saw themselves as the armed vanguard of an isthmus-wide movement.

Nicaragua's new regular army, the Ejercito Popular Sandinista (EPS), was founded in 1979. By the end of last year, according to its commander, it had grown to be "four times as big and eight times as strong" as Somoza's Guardia Nacional.[1] The EPS reached an estimated strength of 20,000, backed up by militias and reserves 80,000 strong. During that period Nicaragua received an estimated $125 million of military equipment and supplies from the Soviet Union alone.[2] It obtained by fair the heaviest tanks in Central America, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, assault helicopters, rocket launchers, and patrol boats. While military pilots and crews trained in Bulgaria and other Eastern European locations, airfields were prepared for advanced jet fighters. More significant, large numbers of foreign military and security advisors were introduced. Currently no less than 2,000 Cubans, 50 Soviets, 35 East Germans, and 50 PLO and Libyan personnel are estimated to be stationed in Nicaragua on security missions. That is roughly one foreign military advisor for every 1,000 Nicaraguans.

In 1980 (just as in 1978 Castro had brought the three main Sandinista factions together in Havana), Cuban agents brought five guerrilla factions from El Salvador together in Managua, worked out a unity pact among them, then set up a joint command and control apparatus in the Managua area and organized logistic and training support on Nicaraguan soil. Since that time, the great bulk of the arms and munitions used by the insurgents in El Salvador have flowed through Nicaragua.[3]

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[1] EPS Chief of Staff Joaquin Cuadra to U.S. Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Major General William E. Odom on November 1982.

[2] By way of comparison, El Salvador received $121 million from the United States during the same period.

[3] Nicaragua's Sandinistas aid the guerrillas in El Salvador by supplying arms, training, financial aid, and by allowing the guerrillas' command and control center to operate near Managua.

Footnote Continued on Next Page

Meanwhile the Sandinistas moved to assert a monopoly of power inside Nicaragua. Elections were ridiculed and postponed. One by one the elements of the broad anti-Somoza coalition were shorn off. The famous newspaper La Prensa was censored, independent radio and TV stations curbed, the labor unions intimidated, the private sector neutralized, the Catholic Church subjected to repeated provocation and attempts at division, the Miskitos and other Nicaraguan Indian minorities persecuted.

Now, Nicaragua's southern border is 300 miles from the Panama Canal, separated only by Costa Rica, a democracy that for almost 35 years has had no army. Its northern border is 300 miles from Mexico. In between are two states, El Salvador and Guatemala, already torn by querrilla violence, and Honduras, whose fledgling democracy is under daily pressure from Nicaragua.

It does not take very much imagination to understand how the Sandinistas' "revolution without frontiers" might spread. Nor how its spread might affect our security. Half our trade flows through the Caribbean. And we depend on the stability of our neighbors to avoid what in certain circumstances could become an unprecedented flow of refugees northward to this country. Especially now, when a troubled world economy invites unrest, we must safeguard democracy and stability in our immediate neighborhood.

We have all seen predatory dictatorships of the right and the left. Germany under Hitler. The Soviet Union under Stalin and since. Yet, there is a school that attributes the expansionism of left-wing dictatorships to pressures from without. According to this proposition, Soviet aggressiveness is but a reaction to the creation of a network of alliances around it, Castro was made a Communist by U.S. confrontation, and Vietnam was radicalized by foreign armies.

ARMS SUPPLY

Arms and ammunition destined for clandestine delivery to El Salvador reach Nicaragua by ship and by direct flights from Havana to Nicaragua. The arms remain stockpiled near Managua until their use by the guerrillas.

Several "smoking guns" have revealed Nicaraguan arms shipments to El Salvador. Nicaragua's Papalonal airfield was used for direct supply flights to the Salvadoran guerrillas for the January 1981 "final offensive"; two overland shipments from Nicaragua through Honduras discovered in 1981 contained weapons originally shipped to American units in Vietnam (similar caches of arms were discovered in Guatemala City in mid-1981, apparently destined for the Guatemalan insurgents); a captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez-Arriola, confirmed that the Sandinistas control weapons delivered from Vietnam to Nicaragua for the Salvadoran insurgents.

The Sandinistas use a variety of routes (overland, air drop and sea) to furnish arms and, increasingly, vitally needed ammunition. In 1982, these supply operations have included increased quantities of heavier weapons, including M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 antitank weapons.

A Salvadoran guerrilla, Alejandro Montenegro, captured during a raid on a guerrilla safehouse in Honduras in August 1982, confirmed that Nicaragua remains the primary source of insurgent weapons and ammunition, although the guerrillas capture some weapons and ammunition from the Salvadoran military. One of the guerrillas captured with Montenegro had made five trips to Managua in 1982 to pick up arms.

TRAINING

Since mid-1980 Salvadoran guerrillas have trained in Nicaragua and Cuba in military tactics, weapons, and explosives. Cubans and other foreign advisors are involved in the training.

One Salvadoran guerrilla who defected to Honduras in September 1981 reported that he and 12 others went from Nicaragua to Cuba for extensive military training in Cuba where over 900 Salvadorans were receiving training.

Several terrorists captured in a safehouse raid in Tegucigalpa in November 1981 told authorities that the Nicaraguan government had provided them with funds for travel and explosives.

Two weeks ago, responding to a local citizen's tip, Honduran security officials surprised a group of Salvadoran guerrillas in transit through Honduras to El Salvador from training camps in Nicaragua. The antisocials escaped after a firefight, but left behind documents identifying infiltration routes.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

After 2 years of combat, the FMLN headquarters near Managua has evolved into a sophisticated command and control center which guides operations. Cuban and Nicaraguan officers are present at this headquarters. The headquarters coordinates logistical support including clothes, money, and ammunition.

Intelligence agencies have provided a mass of classified information on arms supply, training and command and control to the relevant Congressional committees. In a report dated Sept. 22, 1982 the House Intelligence Oversight Committee noted that "intelligence has been able to establish beyond doubt the involvement of Communist countries in the insurgency." The Chairman of the Committee issued a statement on Mar. 4, 1982 stating in part that:

"The insurgents are well-trained, well-equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical support. The intelligence supporting these judgements is convincing.

"There is further persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are further providing the insurgents with bases of operation in Nicaragua. Cuban involvement in providing arms is also evident."

Whatever the merits or defects of these arguments, let me point out that the Nicaraguan case provides ample data to test the policy that usually flows from this proposition—that left-wing radicalization and aggressiveness can be prevented by the political support and economic assistance of the democracies.

Nicaragua is a country of some 2½ million people. Since 1979 it has received from the democracies and multilateral agencies $1.6 billion in economic assistance, or $640 for every man, woman and child. The United States supplied $125 million. Politically, such democratic states as Mexico and the parties belonging to the Socialist International have provided consistent support.

Yet this same period marks the big build-up of the EPS, direct support for violence in El Salvador and the consolidation of internal repression.

It is clear that constructive engagement has not worked in Nicaragua.

So far, negotiation has not worked any better. There have been many efforts. Some continue to this day.

I was involved in a first such effort, travelling to Managua in August 1981 to listen to Sandinista concerns. They told me that they remembered the U.S. Marine occupation in the first decades of the century, that they feared a U.S. invasion and thus needed a big army, and that we should understand that the Salvadoran guerrillas were important as a "shield" to protect Nicaragua.

So we said OK, let's address your concerns. Let's enter into a bilateral nonaggression agreement. The United States could use its influence to encourage Nicaraguan exiles in this country to moderate their behavior. And the United States could renew its economic assistance. In return we asked the Sandinistas to stop training and supplying Salvadoran guerrillas, to give pluralism a chance in their own country—as they had promised to the OAS in 1979—and to limit their military build-up, perhaps through agreement with other Central American countries.

We made these proposals in writing. In October 1981, Managua formally rejected them as "sterile". At the same time, they lied about their ongoing arms supplies to the Salvadoran guerrillas and said they would never limit their military build-up.

A second attempt at negotiation occurred in the spring of 1982, this time at the suggestion of Mexican President Lopez Portillo.

Once again we presented concrete proposals in writing, this time elaborated in eight points presented through our Ambassador in Managua. Once again, there was no concrete response, and no receptivity on issues. Nicaragua simply replied that, before it could respond there would have to be a meeting at a higher level in Mexico. This time, it seemed to us, the Sandinistas wanted to appear to negotiate without actually doing so.

We decided to try a third time. Under Costa Rican leadership, a group of democratic states got together in San Jose in October 1982 to work out a comprehenive set of peace proposals for Central America as a whole. Let me speak a moment about these proposals, because they continue to represent the essence of what we, like Nicaragua's democratic neighbors, are trying to do.

First, the San Jose group agreed the area should be freed from East-West competition. The way to do that, the democracies concluded, is to get all foreign military advisors and trainers out of Central America—Cuba's, the Soviet Union's, Bulgaria's, East Germany's, the PLO's, and ours.

Second, the Central American countries must find a way to live with each other without fear. To this end, the San Jose group proposed mutual and verifiable accords banning the import of heavy offensive weapons, renouncing the support for insurgency on neighbors' territory, and providing for international surveillance of frontiers.

Third, each Central American country must find a way to establish democratic institutions, open to opposition elements. Central American democrats, led by Costa Rica, are particularly clear on the need for democratization. Only in this way could they be confident they will not have to face sometime in the future an aggressive neighbor unconstrained by the limits democracy imposes.

Representing the San Jose group, Costa Rica attempted to contact Nicaragua to ask whether it would enter into a dialogue on these principles. The Sandinistas refused even to receive the proposal, arguing that they had not participated in its formulation, and so were not bound to address it.

So a fourth attempt at negotiations is now being made. In January 1983, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama met on the island of Contadora to propose an effort at mediation of Central America's conflict. Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador responded by proposing that the five Central American

countries—including Nicaragua—meet in the presence of the Contadora group. This would enable Nicaragua to take part in developing the proposals, as it had not in San Jose. And, to maximize the chances that Nicaragua would participate, they suggested that the United States not be present. That would also take care of charges that the conference would be U.S.-dominated.

But still Nicaragua was not receptive. Instead, it went to the U.N. Security Council, claiming that it wants to meet bilaterally with the United States and with Honduras, not regionally. In effect, Nicaragua is saying it wants to discuss Nicaragua's charges against Honduras and the United States—but not its neighbors concerns about Nicaragua's militarization, dictatorship, and intervention in El Salvador.

I have described this history at some length to give you some idea of the extraordinary difficulty of dealing with the Sandinista leadership.

The Sandinistas have made their contempt for genuine dialogue—for real negotiations—quite clear. A month ago, we all saw them interrupt the Pope in a calculated attempt at intimidation—and the Sandinistas followed this up by banning broadcasts of Easter services. Last week, Interior Minister Tomas Borge, in an interview for Cuban television, stressed the subjects his country would not negotiate: Nicaragua, he said, would not discuss the principles of the Sandinista Revolution; it would not enter into a dialogue about the overall Central American situation; and it would not talk about "counter-revolutionaries". He might have added that the Sandinistas are afraid to deal with these issues in any kind of open way—either with their own people or with Nicaragua's increasingly concerned neighbors. So it is sad, rather than surprising, that Borge tells his Cuban TV audience that the proposed meeting of Central American Foreign Ministers is "diplomatic demagogy".

Despite this record, we are not going to give up. The Sandinistas are obviously not yet persuaded that they have to negotiate on substance with either their neighbors or their internal critics. Perhaps they still think that if they bob and weave enough, something will change—that the United States will end or weaken its support for democratic governments in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras—and that the way will again be open for the "revolution without frontiers." We must convince them that that is not the case, that the United States will not abandon its friends in Central America. At the same time, we must go on probing, proposing ways to talk that overcome the old objections—until the Sandinistas tell us they are ready to move to a fair and equitable dialogue.

Meanwhile, Nicaraguans have taken matters into their own hands. Sandinista intransigence has sparked an insurgency that the Sandinistas themselves claim is a threat.

Several thousand guerrillas are now active in Nicaragua. Disillusioned Miskito Indians operate in much of their homeland in the Atlantic lowlands. In the eastern and northern border departments of Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, Madriz, Esteli and Zelaya, significant insurgents forces are attacking government outposts and ambushing military convoys. Guerrilla activity is reported in the central coffee-growing province of Matagalpa. This month for the first time armed dissidence has been reported in the south. Wherever the opposition groups show up, they seem to attract local support, and their numbers grow.

In light of recent allegations in the media, you will ask me right off whether this insurgency has been created or supported by the United States. No American administration has ever discussed this kind of allegation—other than in the Senate and House committees created expressly for the purpose—and this one will not break precedent. But I will describe the Nicaraguan opposition movements; it should be clear to you that it has appeared and expanded in response to deep grievances against the Sandinistas.

Who are the people who have dared challenge Managua's ideologues? What do they want? Based on what we know, several things can be said. Most importantly, they are Nicaraguans to the core. There are two major groups.

One, the larger, is the Frente Democratico Nacional (FDN). Although its main strength is inside Nicaragua, Sandinista repression has driven most of its leaders to Honduras and Costa Rica. The FDN's directorate is made up of Lucia Salazar, the widow of Jorge Salazar, an anti-Somoza businessman murdered by the Sandinistas in 1980; Alfonso Callejas, a former vice-president of Nicaragua who broke cleanly with Somoza in a 1978 attempt to oust Somoza; Edgar Chamorro, an apolitical private sector leader; Indalecio Rodriguez, former vice-rector of the Central American University (UCA); Enrique Bermudez, a

former National Guard colonel whom Somoza removed from Nicaragua by sending him as military attache to Washington from 1975 to 1979 (and whom the Sandinistas themselves have acknowledged played no part in Somoza regime repression); Marco Zeledon, a respected private sector leader with no ties to the Somozas; and Adolfo Calero, a life-long opponent of the Somozas who was jailed by Somoza in 1978. They have publicly stated that their objective is to bring democracy to Nicaragua, not a return to Somocismo. Indeed, several FDN leaders were jailed for their activities against Somoza. In sociological terms, these leaders represent members of the professions and teachers, plus small businessmen and farmers. Their followers include disaffected peasants, former small farmers, Miskito Indians, and other groups displaced or simply repressed by Managua's ideologues. We estimate that the FDN's ranks include over a thousand guerrillas. Former National Guardsmen—mostly non-commissioned officers—lead many of these guerrilla units, but most of the members are peasants and former small farmers.

FDN pronouncements repudiate the Somoza past and affirm the nationalistic and patriotic principles of Sandino. As I am sure the Committee is aware, the FDN proposed a peace plan on January 13, 1983, in which they offered to cease hostilities if among other points the GRN held internationally supervised elections by September 1983, revoked the state of siege in Nicaragua, and separated public administration from partisan political and ideological activities.

The second major group, led by the anti-Somoza hero Eden Pastora, is ARDE—the Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica. ARDE's leaders include such well-known figures as former post-Somoza junta leader Alfonso Robelo, Miskito leader Brooklyn Rivera, and former anti-Somoza fighter Fernando "Negro" Chamorro. Pastora, who was the original Sandinista Vice-Minister of Defense, has repeatedly denounced the revolution's betrayal, which he argues was motivated by Cuban agents enforcing a sellout to the Soviet Union. Most of ARDE's statements have been issued from Costa Rica. ARDE's February 2 peace proposal calls for elections of a constituent assembly by June 1983 to fulfill the promise of the Sandinista revolution.

Caught off balance by the scope of the opposition it has brought upon itself, the Nicaraguan Government has sought to discredit its opponents as "Somocistas"—attempting to associate them with the crimes of the former government. The Sandinistas' current propaganda plan—we have seen the March 24 FSLN memorandum—instructs its political cadres to blame "U.S. imperialism" for the country's problems, to smear Adolfo Calero—a Democratic Conservative Party leader with whom they have negotiated, and Alfonso Robelo—a former member of their own Junta, as "traitors", and to portray opposition as aimed against Nicaragua rather than against its current rulers.

Now the Comandantes have not accepted our proposals before, but I would urge them, before they get too far calling Calero of the FDN and Robelo of ARDE "traitors," to recall that last year they failed to convince their own people that Eden Pastora, a man who is still proud to call himself "a true Sandinista", could be a traitor to the Nicaraguan people or to the original ideals of the Sandinista revolution.

The Sandinistas assert that the only alternative to what they've created is "Somocismo". Nothing could be more simplistic or more false. "Somocismo" was a highly personal traditional dictatorship that died with Somoza. It could not be recreated even if one wished to do so. The Sandinistas know that most Nicaraguans want democracy, peace and an end to Cuban influence. Indeed, that is the program promised the Nicaraguan people in 1979. And that is the program the Sandinistas are today always trying to sweep under the rug they call "Somocismo". The Nicaraguan people remember their history. So should we.

It is not clear what the course of the struggle in Nicaragua will be. What is certain is that, as long as Nicaragua forces legitimate dissent at home to follow violent means and persists in threatening and destabilizing its neighbors, it will never be stable, nor will Central America.

It is conceivable that Cuba or the Soviet Union could be tempted to escalate the conflict, introducing modern fighter aircraft or even Cuban combat troops. Clearly a dangerous situation would then develop, unacceptable not only to Central America but to the American nations as a whole. We have communicated to Moscow and Havana how dangerous such a move would be.

It is also conveivable that, in an effort to distract attention from their internal problems, the Sandinistas might lash out at their neighbors, attacking Costa Rica or Honduras. For over a year, Managua has already been running terrorist

operations in San Jose and infiltrating guerrillas into northern Costa Rican provinces. And there have been frequent border incidents with Honduras. Although journalists who have visited the area report no activity on the Honduran side, Nicaragua has recently reinforced military units on the border. Again, I believe the Sandinistas understand that they could not gain by attacking their neighbors. It is also important to stress that every resource of inter-American diplomacy, including of course that of this country, would be available to prevent such an outburst.

But there is a better way. It is through dialogue and negotiation.

We ask the Sandinistas to think of the Nicaraguan people. Despite all that foreign aid, Nicaraguans in city and countryside are much less well off than before the revolution. They resent the pressures on their churches and their clergy. They distrust and dislike the Sandinista monopoly of power—they have lived under such a system before.

We ask the Sandinistas to consider the insurgency in their own country. Despite—or is it because?—of the presence of all those armed Cubans, popular resistance is spreading. They may conclude that the dialogue they have so many times spurned is preferable to widening civil strife.

We ask the Sandinistas to consider the insurgency they are supporting in El Salvador. If it has legitimate grievances, let them be pursued through democratic institutions. The international community is willing and able to provide security and other guarantees for elections as the answer there as well.

Each element of the Central American problem is related to the other. No amount of land reform, or open elections, or improvement in human rights will end the conflict in El Salvador if Nicaragua continues to fuel it. Democracy will not prosper in Nicaragua's neighbors unless it is practiced in Nicaragua as well. Nicaragua will not be free of the hostility of its own people and of its neighbors, until it begins to address their concerns for democracy and security.

So the answer is democratization and dialogue among neighbors. The purpose of U.S. policy in the area is to create conditions in which the area can be removed from East-West conflict, the import of offensive weapons and mutual support for insurgencies ended, and the democratic transformation of each society achieved. Negotiations among all the Central American countries and negotiations within countries can provide the opportunity for all groups to compete in the voting booth rather than on the battlefield.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Enders.

We have just received a copy of your statement, so we have not had an opportunity to review it carefully. It would appear as though it is one of the more complete statements that we have had on the situation in Central America. Your arguments seem to be that the United States and others have tried dialog with the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas have been intransigent—is that correct—in having such a dialog despite repeated attempts by us to have such a dialog and reach some sort of an accord.

Opposition has, therefore, sprung up from within Nicaragua and is continuing to grow and there would be strong opposition with or without U.S. support to it. There would be strong opposition. Is that a correct conclusion?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That instead of seeking accommodation the Sandinistas have sought to promote insurrection in its neighbors—El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras—and they would have us conclude that all of this could have happened without any U.S. role.

I think this is a thorough statement. It is a helpful statement and so that our colleagues can have it and others in the public sector I will insert it in the Congressional Record this afternoon so that it will be available in full in tomorrow morning's edition.

I think a careful reading of that statement, even by students of Latin America, cannot come to any conclusion other than the fact that this is an extraordinarily complex situation, and that anyone who is taking a

strong public position—and I see many of my own constituents in Illinois are taking strong positions—arriving at conclusions in a complex situation, in a sense are looking at it as a more simple problem than it actually is.

I would hope that everyone who is taking position, regardless of what position they are taking, would study this very carefully indeed. We thank you for your statement.

Unless there is a request that we shorten the question period to get into a closed session, we will go on a 10-minute rule, and I would begin by asking what kind of responses would the United States like to see from the Nicaraguan Government in the current climate in Central America.

Are you yourself persuaded that the range of United States approaches to the Nicaraguan Government are likely to achieve these responses? And you have had a lot of approaches and you have laid it right on the record and made that record clear, that we have tried time and again to reason with them.

Mr. ENDERS. We would like to see Nicaragua join the other Central American countries in a network of accords that could be reached on such issues as mutual support for insurgency and the import of heavy weapons. And we would like to see them join in a common movement to establish political calendars for creating democratic institutions in each country.

We think that Guatemala is prepared to do this. Salvador has already started to do it. Why don't the Nicaraguans join them? Frankly, we would like very much to see the Central Americans deal with their problems among themselves and if indeed the foreign military advisers and trainers in Nicaragua were withdrawn, we would like to withdraw ours from Central America.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made it very clear that the administration is not going to give up on negotiation. There are some that have said, however, that there really is not any hope to deal with this Government in Nicaragua. There is no hope that it can become a respected member of the inter-American community. Would you care to address yourself to that position that has been taken by responsible people?

Mr. ENDERS. Well, it is the Government of Nicaragua. Nicaraguans, some Nicaraguans are trying to change it maybe through a process of negotiation. It could be changed. I would have to agree, Mr. Chairman, that not much has worked so far. There has been an extraordinary willfulness and resistance in Nicaragua, but once again let's not give up and maybe their neighbors and peers can persuade them.

The CHAIRMAN. How important would you believe that Nicaragua's attitudes are to the ultimate resolution of the conflict in El Salvador? You have been discouraging in your testimony about those attitudes.

Mr. ENDERS. As of now they are not encouraging and, as I mentioned, I think that you can do all the political things and economic things and if you still have an insurgency you can fuel from outside you have a crisis on your hands and former things do not satisfy the need for dealing with the insurgency itself.

If, in fact, the Sandinistas were not supporting that with munitions, heavy weapons, training and the command and control apparatus, I think the problem would be much easier. The question is how can you get to a situation in which they pull back. That is the real issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if you would care to expand, Secretary Enders, on the proposals made in April 1982 by our Ambassador in Managua, when he presented a series of different proposals to the government. These proposals enumerated steps for reducing tension in the bilateral relationship. What has been the fate of these proposals? Are they likely to be treated in other forums or in proposals by other countries working for reconciliation in the region, or are they just simply dead?

Mr. ENDERS. There were eight proposals we suggested as an agenda for the talks, and they include such things as cessation of Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in neighboring countries, a U.S. statement pledging to enforce and pursue—use our political influence on the training activities or political activities of exile groups in this country that might attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, a joint Nicaraguan-United States statement pledging noninterference in each other's affairs, regional ban of importation of heavy offensive weapons.

At that time we suggested foreign military advisers should be reduced in the region, military and security forces would be reduced—we have since proposed that they be withdrawn—international verification and so forth, the resumption of United States aid to Nicaragua be part of it, the exchange of artists, musicians, baseball teams and other cultural groups and the reaffirmation by Nicaragua of its previously stated commitments to pluralism, reelections and a mixed economy.

The Nicaraguans said basically we do not want to deal through your Ambassador. We want to have a meeting in Mexico at a higher level, and then we can tell you whether you have anything which we would like to respond to. We thought this was rather strange because we do have relations. We have a first-class Ambassador there, a very experienced one, so we probe that and got the impression that really they did not want to talk seriously.

They could have had preparatory work at the diplomatic level for subsequence conference later on, but they chose not to.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning the media carried an article saying that the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama were meeting in Panama to review the January Contadora document which also proposes a strategy for achieving reconciliation in Central America. What is envisioned, Secretary Enders, in the Contadora plan? How do you believe it may be strengthened?

Mr. ENDERS. The Contadora plan was a general call for intermediation efforts and the foreign ministers of those countries have been quite active in pursuing it. The current proposition is the so-called five plus five proposition. That is to say, the Central American countries would meet at foreign minister level somewhere, perhaps in Santo Domingo, and the Contadora group would be present to encourage and support them.

That proposal has run into a lot of resistance from Nicaragua and the current effort of the Contadora group is to find a way to save it so that the meeting could occur.

The CHAIRMAN. Several of the signatories to the Contadora plan have endorsed the concept of negotiations between the parties to the conflict in El Salvador. Would the United States stand behind an initiative from the region that was able to bring about discussions between the parties to the Salvadoran conflict?

Mr. ENDERS. We would very strongly support negotiations within a constitutional framework. That is to say, for participation in the elections and in the democratic process which is developing painfully but surely in El Salvador. We hope that Nicaragua would make such an offer to its opposition groups so that groups that now oppose, in some cases by arms, could be transformed into political parties seeking their goals by peaceful means.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Enders, your statement dwells a great deal on what has happened in the past, and it is an extraordinarily valuable document for that reason. It is the best analysis that I have seen, the most complete analysis that I have seen updated as to what has really transpired and how you have envisioned and seen and the candor of the administration in this regard is very helpful.

Taking that into perspective but looking ahead now, as we have to, what is the administration's candid assessment of the prospects for reconciliation in Central America under the leadership of the regional states now meeting in Panama? Is the administration, for instance, fully comfortable that it is not participating in these sessions?

Mr. ENDERS. It was suggested to us after the San Jose meeting that it might make it easier for the Nicaraguans to participate if we were not there, so we said OK, let's do it on a regional basis, and we are hopeful that this will lead to a step forward, Mr. Chairman.

The idea of the Central American countries, those most concerned, dealing with each other on their common problems struck us as really basically a very sound one. We can be supportive of that. Now if, in fact, we are asked to engage directly in that process, then we would, of course, do so. But let's give that a chance as a first step and let them see whether they cannot address some of their own concerns about each other.

After all, the problem is that Nicaragua says Honduras is supporting an insurgency in its country. El Salvador says that Nicaragua is supporting an insurgency in its country. They are all worried about the imports of arms, how many foreigners are there. Let's get them started and then see whether they want to have outside support and encouragement from the United States.

I do not mean to suggest that that is the only thing that needs to be done, but it is a useful thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My final question pertains to the skepticism that exists in some quarters with respect to the dual-track approach being taken; that is, cold-to-hostile attitudes toward Nicaragua and the Salvadoran left, along with warm relations with the current Salvadoran Government, even though they are sometimes strained, but there has been an effort to really work with that Government to improve it, to strengthen it, and to cause it to be a government that will be supported by the people across the board in El Salvador.

Those who really want a stable, sound economy will never reconcile with those that are doing everything in their power to literally destroy the economic structure and the future for this generation and the next generation in El Salvador.

But are we likely to achieve Nicaraguan cooperation, in your judgment, in working out a peaceful resolution to the conflict in El Salvador using this dual-track approach? Is this the best, in your judgment now, to approach the problem?

Mr. ENDERS. Let me step back and try to answer that. The Nicaraguan Government that came into power 4 years ago did so after a very brief and not very difficult struggle. Basically, 500 armed men came out of the hills and maybe another 2,500 kids joined them as they went into the city, and the fight was rather brief and Somoza collapsed more or less of his own and left the country.

And they have been very confident about themselves since that time, perhaps decreasingly so now. And one of the first things they did when they came into power was to launch this intervention into El Salvador, and they brushed aside so many attempts that had been offered at negotiation and conciliation.

They are going to have to get over that sort of sense that they were the start of this isthmus-wide revolution for the kind of stability that we are talking about to return to Central America. And the question is, How and when is that going to happen?

Clearly so far persuasion, clearly so far economic support from the democracies, has not done it. If anything, the Government has become more oppressive and more aggressive.

So the question, I suppose, for Nicaraguans is whether the opposition groups which are now appearing are going to persuade the Nicaraguan Government that it cannot pursue this expansionist and oppressive course, and let us hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. The following questions can be answered for the record.

(1) Last year our European allies had several positions on the Central American situation and especially on the question of negotiations with the left in El Salvador. What are the current positions of our allies in Europe with respect to (*a*) the current Government in Nicaragua and (*b*) means to achieve political solutions in the Central American crisis?

(2) In your prepared text you itemize the numbers of Cuban/Soviet advisers who have been in Nicaragua. There is concern that the U.S. attitude will provoke greater Soviet/Cuban involvement. Have you learned of any additional stepped up numbers of Cuban or Soviets who have gone to Nicaragua since reports of U.S. support for the Contra?

(3) And finally, can you comment on Costa Rican and Honduran attitudes toward Nicaragua and efforts to reach accommodation with Nicaragua?

[The information referred to follows:]

Answer (1). Most of the Western European countries joined the United States to assist the new Nicaraguan government in 1979. They were interested in attempting to support more moderate elements within the Sandinista government, and to keep that government on track toward its stated goals of free elections and democracy. Most Western European countries continue to give some assistance to Nicaragua today, but we believe they have few illusions about the Sandinistas' commitment to democracy and elections. Our European allies support a political solution to Central American problems through regional efforts.

Answer (2). The level of Cuban and Soviet military and security advisers in Nicaragua remains at approximately 2,050, respectively. Of course, we continue to monitor the numbers of such advisers closely.

Answer (3). Both countries continue to be worried about the regional objectives of the Sandinistas. Costa Rica still has an unresolved border dispute with Nicaragua over the San Juan river; Honduras is concerned over the violation of its territory by Sandinista supply operations for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Both Costa Rica and Honduras have been the target of Sandinista support for terrorist groups. Costa Rica expelled three Nicaraguan diplomats linked to the bombing of an airline office in July 1982. I would like to point out that Costa Rica and Honduras both signed the October 1982 San Jose Declaration, which called for an end to foreign support for guerrilla groups and for limits on foreign advisers and arms purchases in Central America. Nicaragua later refused to receive Costa Rican Foreign Minister Volio in order to discuss the San Jose declaration. In February 1983, Honduras invited Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D'Escoto to fly over the sites of alleged guerrilla camps in Honduras; D'Escoto declined the offer.

Thank you very much, Secretary Enders.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In your statement you mentioned that the administration has tried to convince Nicaragua to renounce support for insurgency in neighboring countries. I think that is a great objective, but are we not doing exactly the same thing in Nicaragua?

Mr. ENDERS. The chairman said at the start of this session that he did not expect me to answer questions of that kind, and with your agreement, Senator, I will not do so. We do have, of course, the Intelligence Committees at which such questions could be asked.

But perhaps you have some thoughts yourself on how it would be possible to get Nicaragua to renounce that support, since so many efforts have been made and they have not yet succeeded.

Senator PELL. I was struck by the suggestion of Mr. Pastora that, as I recall it, he said that he thought the U.S. policy of support for the guerrillas, no matter if we are or we are not—but let us say theoretically we are helping to some degree the opposition elements in Nicaragua—would polarize the opposition and make it more difficult for him. Have you heard this argument at all? Do you think it has merit?

Mr. ENDERS. The people have said that, well, if an opposition group appears in Nicaragua, then as you say that is going to justify repressive measures, they would declare a national emergency, as they have, and any actions to eliminate nonviolent opposition will be legitimatized by that.

However, it might be interesting to put that in an historical frame, Senator Pell, because the first actions by the so-called Contra's occurred in March 1982, but already prior to that time all of the repressive actions that we know well—intimidation of La Prensa and the takeover of the unions and the closing of the free radio stations and the jailing of the leaders of the private sector groups, and so forth, and the process of pressure and intimidation on the church—were already in place.

So in a sense, the Contra activity comes after, rather than having provoked all of that. So I think that abstractly I would agree that what you raise is a consideration. In this particular case, it has in fact been the other way around.

And Eden Pastora, by the way, says that he himself will now take arms and start the armed struggle.

Senator PELL. In connection with the situation in Honduras, I had an amendment that received 29 votes, but on the other hand it was

defeated by about 65 on the other side, that would have avoided the enlargement of the runways in Honduras. I think there were three airports that were going to be enlarged in order to take bigger planes, military planes, what you will.

What is the present status of that runway development?

Mr. ENDERS. I think it is in course, but I do not know offhand. I will have to tell you in writing.

[The information referred to follows:]

STATUS OF RUNWAY DEVELOPMENT

Funds in the amount of $13 million have been appropriated for improvement of one airfield in Honduras, at Comayagua, which is the site of a military aviation school. Construction will include a 2,400-foot extension of the runway to 8,000 feet, a 1,000-foot unpaved overrun, a concrete ramp and revetments, and a 10,000-barrel fuel storage tank. Honduras will provide physical security and basic maintenance at this facility.

Senator PELL. My understanding was that one was going ahead and the other two——

Mr. ENDERS. Our full request was not funded, so we have limited it to one, that is correct. But exactly what has happened, I do not know.

Senator PELL. And which is that one that is going ahead?

Mr. ENDERS. Comayagua.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

In the leaked national security document—we can call this either fiction or fact; it was in the New York Times a few days ago, the national security document, entitled "Policy in Central America and Cuba." It states in the course of it that we are seeking to isolate Mexico.

I was just curious, in your view is it a part of our national policy to keep Mexico isolated in its relationship to this Central America imbroglio?

Mr. ENDERS. No. We have in fact engaged in very substantial efforts to the contrary. Mexico joined us in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, as you will recall. We have had constant discussions with Mexico on Central America issues, and indeed, we coordinated quite closely with Mexico prior to the launching of this Contadora initiative that has been spoken of here. The Mexicans asked us down to consult with them beforehand. We remain in very close touch.

I think all of the regional countries are essential to the ultimate solution of this problem, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you on your conclusion that has just been expressed. However, the text that I read here, which as I say may be fiction, but usually the Times is pretty accurate, it says that we should adopt a more active diplomatic campaign to turn around Mexico and Social Democrats of Europe; in the meantime keep them isolated on Central American issues and highlight positive support for Christian Democratic parties and key trade unions.

I am glad that the policy you just mentioned of utilizing our friendship with Mexico and bringing Mexico into the process is the policy we are following, and not the one that is quoted in this document.

Why, Mr. Secretary, did Ambassador Kirkpatrick reject the Nicaraguan proposal for separate talks between Nicaragua and Honduras, and between Nicaragua and the United States, under the auspices of the United Nations? Why not give that idea a chance?

Mr. ENDERS. I think this record shows that whenever we say, well, why not, let us have item A, then the Nicaraguans say, well, we really want B. So then you sort of try to adjust and you say, all right, well, here is B; now they want A or they want C again.

And this is exactly what has happened as a result of the San Jose agreement. They said, we did not participate in it, so we have to participate in the next meeting. So the suggestion was made of a meeting in which they would participate. No; they did not want to do that; they wanted to go back and go bilaterally with the United States.

I do not exclude such talks at some time in the future, but they should not be used as a technical device to avoid whatever the serious negotiating proposal is of the moment, which is I think what is happening in the case of the United Nations.

Senator PELL. If the situation continues to heat up in Nicaragua and its neighboring countries and Nicaragua should request active military support from outside the immediate area, whether it be Cuba or whether it be from some other nation, what would be our response? What could be our response?

Mr. ENDERS. We have indicated to the Cubans and to the Soviet Union that such a response would create indeed a very dangerous situation, one that we are sure that all the American states would regard as very dangerous and very undesirable.

I think the point here, Senator Pell, is that just as I think there is unanimity in this country that American troops should not be employed in Central America, it has been frequently stated and restated by our President, I think there would be a very strong feeling that Cuban and Soviet troops should not be used in Central America. We should deter that.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Mr. Secretary, let me say that your analysis of the departure by the Sandinistas from a pluralistic society to one of not so much repression but exclusivity is one that I share. My attitude toward this, toward the two groups involved, is basically, a pox on both your houses. I think the Sandinistas have destroyed a marvelous opportunity for pluralism and have become extremely ideological, and I think have a very sorry record, and I state that at the outset.

Now, let me deal with what we are doing in Nicaragua. I refer to a November 16, 1981, National Security Council document which was referred to in the Washington Post, that detailed the CIA support for "political and paramilitary operations" in Nicaragua, with the broad purpose of combating the Sandinistan regime.

Give me a reason to doubt the veracity of that memorandum.

Mr. ENDERS. As I said, Senator Tsongas, I do not think any American administration has ever commented on allegations of covert action in public or intelligence matters in general, and I do not think this one will be an exception.

Senator TSONGAS. On April 6, 1982, another National Security Council document: "In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are under increased pressure as a result of our covert efforts."

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. ENDERS. I am not aware of the document you are referring to.

Senator TSONGAS. This is a National Security Council document on policy in Central America and Cuba, provided at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group in April 1982, and it appeared in the New York Times April 7.

Mr. ENDERS. I am not quite clear what the reference is, but I think that——

Senator TSONGAS. Maybe we can provide a copy to you.

Mr. ENDERS. The statement apparently refers to a situation a year ago, and it was a situation I think in which Nicaragua was increasingly isolated from other countries in Central America as a result of the developments that you yourself have just, I think very eloquently, described.

Senator TSONGAS. I did not describe our covert efforts. Did I describe that?

Mr. ENDERS. Oh, our covert. I am sorry, I thought you said "overt." I am not going to comment on covert efforts. Certainly, the poor state of their economy is a well-known fact.

Senator TSONGAS. Excuse me?

Mr. ENDERS. As I say, I am not going to comment on suggestions of covert efforts, but the poor state of their economy is a well-demonstrated fact.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, I just point out, I am not saying this. This is the National Security Council. Those people are on your side if I remember correctly.

If the National Security Council is saying that we have engaged in covert activities, one must assume that they are telling the truth, and that is in violation of the so-called Boland amendment, is it not? If we are engaged in covert activities, would that not violate the Boland amendment?

Mr. ENDERS. Have you read the Boland amendment, Senator?

Senator TSONGAS. Several times.

Mr. ENDERS. Would it be out of place for me to read it here?

Senator TSONGAS. Out of place?

Mr. ENDERS. OK. It says:

None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities to any group or individual not part of a country's armed forces for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.

"For the purpose of"; that is the Boland amendment. It replaced an amendment which had been introduced by Mr. Harkin, and the Boland amendment was approved by an overwhelming majority after some debate. And I think in the course of that debate the difference between those two became clear.

May I read the Harkin amendment:

None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities to any group or individual not part of a country's armed forces for the purpose of assisting that group or individual in carrying out military activities in or against Nicaragua.

Senator TSONGAS. So your position would be that the Harkin amendment goes to activities which are not prohibited by the Boland amendment?

Mr. ENDERS. The Harkin amendment is clearly much more sweeping than the Boland amendment, and it refers to all activities in Nicaragua, not simply activities for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua, and so forth.

Senator TSONGAS. Would you draw a distinction between overthrowing the government and putting pressure on the government, so that if you provide arms for the purpose of putting pressure upon the government that is all right? If it is not for the express purpose of overthrow, then it is allowable under the Boland amendment; is that your interpretation?

Mr. ENDERS. I think the interpretation of it clearly is a matter in the first instance for the Intelligence Committees, as to how it could be applied to any given situation. But there is—in one case it prohibits all activities. In the other case it prohibits activities which have the purpose cited.

Clearly it is a difference, and the question is, How do you interpret that? I would think that the Intelligence Committees would be able to do so.

Senator TSONGAS. How would you feel if the material we are providing to the opposition parties in Nicaragua should in fact lead to overthrow? Would you call them up and say, that was not allowable under the Boland amendment and could they reverse their victory?

Mr. ENDERS. It refers to a purpose, so quite clearly questions of what the intent are would be the ones that we would expect to be asked.

Senator TSONGAS. Have you ever met a Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista that we have been helping who was not in the field with a gun for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua?

Mr. ENDERS. There are many anti-Sandinistas who ardently hope that that will occur.

Senator TSONGAS. That that will occur?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes.

Senator TSONGAS. And they have received weapons from us?

Mr. ENDERS. That is a statement made by you, Senator.

Senator TSONGAS. There is an article in the Times of April 5 making reference to Dr. Jerez, a member of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, who criticized the policy of the administration and basically made the point that the faction that we are supporting is indeed populated by many former Somoza types, some Somozistas, and he felt that what we were doing was counterproductive.

Have you met with Jerez and talked about his concerns about our policy?

Mr. ENDERS. No; but I have met with a large number of other members of that faction, as well as with members of the FDN.

Senator TSONGAS. And does Jerez' statement reflect their position? Have they—did they reject his concerns?

Mr. ENDERS. There are competing factions here that represent different tendencies, and perhaps we should not necessarily take one or the other as the sort of final word on this.

I did not read that part of the prepared statement that I have on the leadership of the FDN. It contains one person who was in a leadership role of the Guardia Nacional, Enrique Bermudez. He, however, was sent to Washington by Somoza as military attaché to get him out of the country, regarded apparently as a threat by the Somoza

regime. And the others were opponents of Somoza. In some cases they were people who were jailed for their opposition to Somoza.

Senator TSONGAS. He makes the point that—he refers to the FDN as a "return to the past." You do not share that view?

Mr. ENDERS. I think that an organization which is largely composed of the opponents of Somoza cannot be so described.

Senator TSONGAS. It reminds me—you know, it is very hard to find who the Somozistas are that disappeared. It is like trying in the United States to find anybody who voted for Richard Nixon. You know they have to be there.

Mr. ENDERS. It is not hard to find them. There are many people who proclaim that still. It happens that this organization is not led by them, but you can find some Somozistas, indeed. You can find them in this country and elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Tsongas.

Senator Zorinsky.

Senator ZORINSKY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms.

Senator TSONGAS. Could I ask that this article appear in the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be entered in the record.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the New York Times, Apr. 5, 1983]

FOE OF SANDINISTS FAULTS U.S. POLICY

(By Raymond Bonner)

"THIS IS NOT THE WAY TO DO IT," HE SAYS OF ADMINISTRATION BACKING FOR GUERRILLAS

WASHINGTON, Apr. 4.—A leader of one of Nicaragua's "anti-Sandinist groups today criticized the Reagan Administration's support for guerrillas who are trying to topple the Sandinist Government, saying it would lead to sharper political divisions and less likelihood that a democratic government would eventually come to power.

"If the Reagan Administration wants to democratize Nicaragua and pacify the region, this is not the way to do it," said the spokesman, Dr. Alvaro Jerez, a member of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, an anti-Sandinist group based in Costa Rica.

In an interview, Dr. Jerez added that the Administration's support for a military solution in Nicaragua would fail because the Sandinist Army would defeat the guerrillas.

"We are presenting ourselves as a third way out," said the 40-year-old neurosurgeon, who was educated at George Washington University medical school.

Former Sandinist is leader

But he added, in response to a question, that the group's leaders had not been particularly successful when they traveled through Europe this year in search of support from governments and Socialist parties.

The Revolutionary Alliance is headed by Edén Pastora Gómez, a former hero of the Nicaraguan revolution who is also known as Commander Zero; Alfonso Robelo, a businessman who was a member of the first junta after Nicaragua's former leader, Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, fled, and Brooklyn Rivera, a popular leader of the Miskito Indians. Dr. Alvarez, who is a top aide to Mr. Robelo and Mr. Pastora, was a member of the Council of State, the legislative body established by the Sandinists, before he fled into exile last year.

"Nicaragua is being polarized," Dr. Jerez said.

"Cuba and Russia are behind one side, the United States is behind the other," he added, referring to the Sandinists on the one hand and the Nicaraguan Democratic Force on the other. It is the armed members of the Democratic Force who are fighting in the north of Nicaragua in an effort to topple the Sandinist Government.

"A return to the past"

According to informed sources in the United States and Honduras, as well as reporters who have traveled with the guerrillas, the Democratic Force rebels have been trained and armed by the United States and the Administration is still supporting them, primarily by providing intelligence information.

Many, if not most, of the Democratic Force guerrillas are former members of General Somoza's national guard, including a senior leader, Enrique Bermúdez, a fact that prompted Dr. Jerez to say that the organization represented a "return to the past."

The existence of the two anti-Sandinist groups would appear to present a problem for countries, and even Nicaraguans, searching for an alternative to the Marxist-Leninist drift of the Sandinist Government.

The Revolutionary Alliance has virtually no military power, according to Dr. Jerez and others familiar with the organization, and so a military victory is not a part of its strategy. But it would appear to be in the best position to gain backing within Nicaragua and internationally, something the Democratic Force would presumably find difficult to obtain because of its links to the Somoza regime.

In the interview, Dr. Jerez, who said that he and the other members of his organization were "dissident revolutionaries, not counterrevolutionaries," outlined the proposals they had submitted to the Sandinists through informal channels. He said that the group wanted the Sandinists to commit themselves to elections for a constituent assembly this year and to the lifting of all press censorship.

Negotiations are rejected

Dr. Jerez said that the Revolutionary Alliance was not seeking any positions in the Government but that the Sandinists had rejected all efforts at negotiations.

The group has nevertheless praised much of what the Sandinists have done since coming to power. In a document signed by Mr. Pastora, Mr. Robelo and Mr. Rivera, it said:

"The literacy campaign, the confiscation of Somoza's property, the nationalization of the financial system, foreign commerce, and natural resources, the improvements in the distribution of income, some aspects of agrarian reform, are accomplishments which should be defended and fully implemented."

The document said that the Revolutionary Alliance would not accept any support from the Reagan Administration or the Central Intelligence Agency "since these forces are in open contradiction to our revolutionary ideals."

Dr. Jerez said it was an error to think the Sandinists could be defeated militarily, even by guerrillas trained and armed by the United States. He compared the guerrilla war in El Salvador with the one now beginning in Nicaragua. In both countries, he said, there are about 5,000 guerrillas. That number has not been able to topple the Government of El Salvador, whose army, Dr. Jerez noted, was about half the size of the Sandinists' army "and not as ideologically motivated."

In addition, he said, the Democratic Force would never be able to gain widespread support among the Nicaraguan peasants because of its links to General Somoza.

Asked how the Revolutionary Alliance expected to come to power without an army, Dr. Jerez said that the group had the support of many Sandinists within the Government and was organizing the peasants.

"Not all of them are Marxists-Leninists," he said of the Sandinist leaders.

"No solution from the outside is going to be a solution," he added.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, I apologize. I have three committee meetings going on at the same time and I had to slip out. I do not know how much attention has been focused on the Boland amendment, but do you have any idea what time of night that amendment was passed by the House?

Mr. ENDERS. It must have been very late.

Senator HELMS. It was after 11 o'clock. It was one of those cases when I daresay that many of the House Members did not give much thought to what they were doing.

But in any case, are you aware that the same proposition was defeated in the Senate?

Mr. ENDERS. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. I think that must be considered, in view of the emphasis that is being placed on it. Furthermore, I have had a number of lawyers tell me that it is subject to interpretation. But I did want to make the point for the record that the Senate defeated this and it was slipped in, virtually. People were tired over in the House, and I imagine they were not giving much thought to what they were doing in terms of the national policy.

Senator PELL. I just must ask here, does the Senator really believe that there is a difference in the application of a law passed when the Congress is tired or not tired?

Senator HELMS. No.

Senator TSONGAS. If we could have an asterisk next to those laws, it would be helpful.

Senator HELMS. I would say that is the same sort of thing that occurred when the Congress, particularly the Senate, passed the so-called 5-cent gas tax increase, but not a Member of the Senate had read the conference report. They voted hastily so they could go home for Christmas.

Now, of course, I do not suggest that we violate the law. On the other hand, I do not think we are bound to take Paul Tsongas' interpretation of what the amendment is, or Jesse Helms' interpretation of the amendment. But I do say that competent lawyers say that it is subject to interpretation.

Senator ZORINSKY. Mr. Chairman. I would just like to briefly make a comment. Ambassador, I do not know, and I am not going to get into the details of what time of the day it was when we signed the charter for the Organization of American States. But let me read article 18:

> No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs to any other state. The foregoing principles prohibits not only armed force, but also any other form of interference or attempted threat.

Article 19 of the charter of the Organization of American States says:

> No state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force a sovereign will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

So, forgetting our own statutes and rules, I would refer to the OAS charter, to which we are a signator. I do not know if that organization is as active as it should be or adheres to its own doctrine as much as it should. But I think it would be well-advised to reevaluate our membership, if we cannot abide by the provisions of the treaty establishing the organization.

It grieves me this morning, but I agree with much of your evaluation that the Nicaraguan Sandinista government has not lived up to its commitments. Many promises were broken. And I am sadly disturbed by the current events in Nicaragua.

I also get concerned when my alarm clock radio goes off in the morning and I hear our Ambassador to the United Nations say that, ha, ha, ha, we found a way to get around the U.S. Congress. We can put as many advisers as we want into Honduras, and that does not count against a maximum ceiling on the level of advisers that we currently have agreed to have in El Salvador.

We are all adults in this business, and we do not need to play those types of games. I am one of those who happens to think that if we need to train a better Salvadoran military force, certainly it is less expensive to do it in El Salvador, than taking their force to either this country or any other place.

But to play this political shell game of saying, well, we do not come under that law because we are going to do it over here, and therefore we can do without you fellows, is a childish effort at circumvention. I salute the same flag the Ambassador does. I get the same color paycheck she does. And mine says "United States of America" above it also.

I think the time has come when the administration can avoid these types of confrontations. Some bright mind up here, either on this side or the House side, eventually is going to present legislation to prohibit or to put a cap on advisers, regardless of where in Central America they are. If you stop playing games, I think we can avoid that type of a confrontation.

Mr. ENDERS. I would hope so, Senator, because I did not hear what Ambassador Kirkpatrick said, but the number of U.S. military personnel in Honduras is not particularly large. It is about 60 overall. That compares with 54 trainers. There are some additional military personnel as defense attachés and so forth in El Salvador, but the cap is usually applied to trainers, and we have not thought of the number in Honduras as particularly high or trying to offset in Honduras what there is not in El Salvador.

Senator ZORINSKY. It also bothers me when the El Salvadoran Air Force celebrates their 60th anniversary, and a large portion of their officers do not show up for the celebration.

We all read the reports in the news media, and there appears to be dissention in their armed forces. And I have a lot of people in Nebraska that are scraping their money up trying to get it in to the Federal Government by Friday, which is the magic date of April 15, income tax time. These Americans are being asked to support an army in El Salvador that cannot agree among itself who its leadership should be and an air force that hasn't enough of a national feeling to show up for the celebration of its own anniversary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask the timekeeper if I have time remaining. I yielded to the Senator from Nebraska.

The Senator mentioned, and he is my friend, and we agree on most things, he mentioned game playing. I say again that game playing is sort of a two-way street, and there has been a great deal of legislative game playing with reference to Central America to the extent, I will say to my friend that the real issue is being obscured, that issue being whether we are going to fail to do whatever we can to prevent a Marxist takeover of Central America. That is the issue.

And I sense that the Boland amendment and the unsuccessful effort which was similar in the Senate had the clear intention of frustrating the administration's conduct of foreign policy.

Now, you can argue the details all you wish, and reasonable people can differ. We can agree to disagree agreeably, but in the final analysis what we are talking about is the question of whether Central America

is going to have a chance to avoid being taken over by Marxism. That is it. No coloration can change that part of it.

I wish the game playing would stop. I do not think it will, because I see thrust after thrust, and the media cannot be absolved from its participation in this, because they give one side of what is going on. You hear so much about the atrocities on one side and none about the atrocities on the other, and that sort of thing.

But the American people had better come alive and realize that what happens in Central America, what happens in El Salvador is not long ago and far away, because if Central America falls, we are going to be flooded with refugees, 10, 15, 20 million of them coming across our borders, people who cannot speak English, who have no jobs, who have nothing.

And I want my friends who are so insistent upon thwarting and frustrating the administration in trying to keep that situation under control in a modest sort of way, I want them to tell me now what they will do with those 10, 15, 20 million poor souls who are fleeing, trying to avoid living under communism.

That is the issue. It is not whether the amendment was passed at 11 o'clock at night. The question is whether the House of Representatives knew what it was doing. Several members of the Foreign Affairs Committee told us that they had no idea what was going on, not one idea of what that amendment was or its implications, and I say again that the U.S. Senate, in a rollcall vote, defeated the proposition.

So we had better be careful what we are doing with the future of this country.

Any further comment?

[No response.]

Senator HELMS. Hearing none, and acting on behalf of the chairman, I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. I was on the telephone with another colleague. I would like to simply announce that the request for a classified and closed session with Secretary Enders has been withdrawn. It will be replaced by a request to the Intelligence Committee to brief the members of the Foreign Relations Committee as a committee on Nicaragua. And that will be scheduled just as quickly as we possibly can.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the committee adjourned, to convene immediately in business session.]

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